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NOTES
THE ECONOMIC WISDOM OF REGULATING
PHARMACEUTICAL "FREEBIES"
In the United States today, nearly two-thirds of all patient visits end
with the doctor writing a prescription. Almost seventy-five percent of
these prescribed drugs are paid for by the patient out-of-pocket. Unlike
other consumer purchases, however, the drugs are chosen by a third-
party, the physician, who rarely considers price.' The use of medicines
in the United States has increased more than the use of any other health
resource over the past thirty years.2 From 1950 to 1975, the number of
prescriptions dispensed per capita to ambulatory people in the U.S. rose
from 2.4 to 7.6 per year.3 One estimate is that in 1990, $70 billion of the
total health care cost of $1 trillion will represent drug expenses.4
In light of the increasing predominance of the drug market in the
health care industry, rising prices for pharmaceutical products, 5 and con-
1. See Wilkes & Shuchman, Pitching Doctors, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at
88, 89. Doctors' demand for prescriptions drugs is relatively inelastic. Price elasticity is the measure
of the extent to which a change in price produces a corresponding change in demand. The mathe-
matical relationship is percentage change in quantity demanded divided by the percentage change in
price. Thus, an inelastic demand occurs when a change in the price of a good has little effect on the
demand for that good. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 381-84 (10th ed. 1976).
Because doctors do not pay for the drugs they prescribe, their demand is contingent on price
only to the degree that the doctor is concerned about the finances of the patient. Critics Wilkes and
Shuchman contend that this concern is minimal. Wilkes & Shuchman, supra, at 89. For additional
support of this view, see P. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 448 (3d ed. 1988).
2. See Mackowiak & Gagnon, Effects of Promotion on Pharmaceutical Demand, 20 Soc. SC.
MED. 1191, 1191 (1985).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Senator Edward Kennedy first held hearings in 1973 on the effects of promotion on in-
creased prices for drug products. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health ofthe Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Hearings]. Senator Ken-
nedy again held hearings on December 11-12, 1990, to address the role of promotional costs in
creating drug prices that have outpaced inflation. Advertising, Marketing and Promotional Practices
of the Pharmaceutical Industry: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Kennedy Hearings 1990]; Firms' Promotions Raise Drug
Prices, Senators Told, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 12, 1990, at 17, col. 3.
In 1989, Senator David Pryor and the Special Committee on Aging issued their report on rising
drug costs and the actual value of new drug innovations. See MAj. STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL
COMM. ON AGING, 101ST CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES: ARE WE
GETrING OUR MONEY'S WORTH? (Comm. Print 1989) [hereinafter AGING REPORT].
Vol. 1991:206] PHARMACEUTICAL "FREEBIES"
cerns that the pharmaceutical companies may possess monopoly power,6
the United States Government, major U.S. hospitals, and health care
commentators are focusing on the sales and pricing practices of pharma-
ceutical companies. One of the most questionable of these practices is
Economists suggest, however, that drug price inflation has not been as great as that of other
health care products. Health care economist Paul Feldstein notes that the drug price index has
increased from 115.3 in 1960 to 256.5 in 1985. Over this same period, the Medical Care Price Index
has risen from 79.1 in 1960 to 403.1 in 1985, while some components of this index, such as hospital
services, have increased from 57.3 to 710.5 over this period. P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 438.
6. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 439-51. The issue of monopoly power in the industry
relates directly to an evaluation of the promotional activities of pharmaceutical companies. Econo-
mists frequently argue that monopolistic industries are characterized by high expenditures for pro-
motion and Research and Development (R&D). Monopoly is viewed as harmful to the consumer
because producers are "price makers" and they upset natural market equilibrium by deriving greater
than "normal" profits. W. NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION
323-324, 333 (4th ed. 1987).
The most common method for evaluating the existence of monopoly power is ascertaining the
market share or "concentration ratio" of the industry leaders. Analysts agree that oligopoly (a
market characterized by only a few sellers) begins to "rear its head" when the leading four firms
control 40% or more of the total market. P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 441 (quoting F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 67 (1980)). The pharmaceuti-
cal industry contends that there is tight competition in the industry. Kennedy Hearings 1990, supra
note 5, at 164 (testimony of Gerald Mossinghoff, President of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association claiming that no company commands more than 8.2% of the U.S. drug market, and that
the sales of 21 companies must be combined to reach 75% of the market). Other commentators
concur. Paul Feldstein writes:
There are approximately 1,000 drug firms in this country. The four-firm concentration
ratio in the pharmaceutical industry (as of 1973) was 27.8 percent. This is certainly lower
than for automobiles, which is 99 percent; cigarettes, 84 percent; and soaps and detergents,
62 percent. Further, no one firm accounts for more than 8 percent of total drug sales in the
United States.
P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 442 (footnote omitted). However, Feldstein warns that the concen-
tration analysis of the drug industry may be unique because the industry comprises a number of
different therapeutic areas that serve as sub-markets. Id. at 442. Data suggest that firm market
concentration is monopolistic within these therapeutic markets. Table 1 presents this evidence from
1972:
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1991:206
pharmaceutical marketing,7 which has only recently received attention in
the national media. Although professional advertising is normally
closely scrutinized,8 regulation of promotions to health care professionals
by drug company salespersons has been minimal.
The salespersons responsible for making personal visits to physi-
cians and hospital staff are often called "detailers" or pharmaceutical
sales representatives ("PSRs").9 Because of the recent explosion in phar-
maceutical prices and a media focus on the relationships between doctors
and drug companies, pharmaceutical detailing has become an area of
TABLE 1
CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN MAJOR THERAPEUTIC MARKETS, 1972
Market Share of
Top Four Firms
Therapeutic Market (percent)
Analgesics 60
Antacids 86
Antibacterials 80
Antibiotics (broad and medium spectrum) 60
Antihistamines 59
Antiobesity products 83
Antispasmodics 57
Ataraxics and tranquilizers 76
Cardiovasculars 54
Diabetic therapy 76
Diuretics 74
Muscle relaxants 50
Oral contraceptives 86
Psychostimulants 85
Sedatives 46
Sulfonamides 81
M. STATMAN, COMPETITION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: THE DECLINING PROFIT-
ABILITY OF DRUG INNOVATION 47 (1983) (citing ARTHUR D. LrrLE, INC., THE PHARMACEUTI-
CAL INDUSTRY: AN ANALYSIS OF 1973 SALES AND AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRODUCTS
(1974)).
Even within therapeutic markets, the concentration ratio is not the sole determinant of monop-
oly power and collusion between firms. If entry into the industry by new companies is fairly open,
the ratios can be upset at any time by a new company with an innovative drug. Id. at 48; see also
Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW
LEARNING 164 (1974). New drug companies have prompted these market shake-ups in the past. M.
STATMAN, supra, at 49. Thus, even within therapeutic markets, the drug industry is competitive. P.
FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 449-50. Although a unique drug can bring a good price during the
years of patent exclusivity, its price will decline over time as the patent expires and competitors enter
the market. Id. at 451.
7. See, eg., Bernstein, Prescription Drugs: Pitching Directly to the Patient, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT, Jan. 15, 1990, at 46; Wilkes & Shuchman, supra note 1, at 88.
8. See, e.g., L. PATTERSON & T. METZLOFF, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY § 14.04, at 791-822 (3d ed. 1989) (discussing limits on advertising for legal serv-
ices); C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 297-305 (1988) (discussing limits on ad-
vertising for health care services).
9. Detailers are trained to be both salespersons and drug specialists. For a discussion of phar-
maceutical companies' hiring and training practices, see infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
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great concern to Congress, the American Medical Association (AMA),
and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association (PMA).10 In De-
cember of 1990, Congress began a renewed effort to scrutinize the detail-
ing efforts of the country's pharmaceutical companies. Senator Edward
Kennedy held hearings before the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee on the topic of pharmaceutical advertising, marketing, and
promotional practices.11 Kennedy's inquiry followed twenty years of
congressional interest in this subject.12 However, the laws that resulted
from prior hearings related more to the dispersion of free products and
the marketing of unsafe products than to detailing specifically.1 3 The
1990 hearings focused narrowly on the ethics and economics of the de-
tailer-doctor relationship, and the reactions by the AMA, the PMA, and
the nation's doctors and hospitals to these hearings have made this issue
particularly timely.
This Note addresses the economic, legal, and ethical questions in-
volved in regulating the activities of detailers. Section I outlines the ac-
tivities of detailers and the extensive commitment drug companies have
made to encourage the use of these pharmaceutical foot soldiers. Section
II discusses the ethical implications of the gift-giving relationship be-
tween physicians and pharmaceutical companies. Section III considers
the economic effects of detailing practices on consumers, and Section IV
outlines the educational role of the detailer. Section V suggests the
proper role that Congress, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
and industry groups (including the AMA and the PMA) should play in
controlling these activities. This Note concludes that, from an economic
and ethical perspective, pharmaceutical sales representatives and the
pharmaceutical "freebies" they give doctors play a crucial role in inform-
ing doctors about the newest drug technologies. Moreover, the open and
direct promotional environment enables small drug companies to enter
the industry and promotes research and innovation in drug therapy.
I. THE AcTIvITIEs OF DETAILERS
Major U.S. pharmaceutical companies employ more than 20,000 de-
tailers,14 expending over fifty percent of their promotional budgets on
detailing activities. 15 To promote their products, drug companies spent
10. The PMA represents the legislative interests of 100 major U.S. pharmaceutical companies.
11. Kennedy Hearings 1990, supra note 5.
12. 1973 Hearings, supra note 5.
13. For more information on these hearings, see infra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
14. See Pekkanen, The Impact of Promotion on Physicians' Prescribing Patterns, 6 J. DRUG
IssuEs 13 (1976).
15. See Lexchin, Doctors and Detailers: Therapeutic Education or Pharmaceutical Promotibn?,
19 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVS. 663 (1989).
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more than $5000 in detailing efforts for each of the country's 479,000
doctors in 1988, for a total of approximately $2.5 billion.16
The activities of these "hands-on" sellers vary widely. In the hospi-
tal setting, detailers are often the first source of information about new
drugs. 17 Pharmaceutical representatives spend most of their time in pri-
vate meetings with physicians, disseminating the newest information
about company products. Physicians meet with detailers as often as
three to five times each week.18 Detailers frequently treat doctors and
hospital residents to lunches or dinners at which the detailers discuss
their products. The drug companies may also sponsor medical confer-
ences that have been developed by hospitals, medical schools, or profes-
sional associations. 19 Sales representatives leave reminders in the form of
notepads, pens, rulers, and other useful "freebies" engraved with the logo
of the drug company and the product name.20 Detailers also leave large
numbers of free drug samples for physician trials.2'
These practices are primarily innocent marketing techniques for
drug companies to directly advertise to doctors who have almost com-
plete control over the purchasing of pharmaceuticals. 22 However, these
innocent practices rest on one side of a continuum that also includes bla-
16. See Wilkes & Shuchman, supra note 1, at 89.
17. See Thomas, National Survey of Hospital Policies on Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives'
Activities, 44 AM. J. HosP. PHARMACY 1334 (1987) [hereinafter Thomas I].
18. See Kennedy Hearings 1990, supra note 5, at 101 (testimony of Dr. John C. Nelson).
19. See McMurray, Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical
Association, reprinted in Kennedy Hearings 1990, supra note 5, at 217 (testimony of Dr. Richard J.
McMurray, Chairman of CEJA).
20. Dr. John Nelson listed the "freebies" that he has received:
golf balls with a company or drug logo, rulers, pens, pencils, note pads, mugs, glasses, cups,
hats, caps, shirts, magnets, towels, tie tacks, clipboards, a large variety of anatomic models,
games, puzzles, socks, visors, packages of candy, gum, popcorn, tickets to shows, dinners,
weekend getaways, golf fees, tennis balls, and cash.
Kennedy Hearings 1990, supra note 5, at 101 (testimony of Dr. John C. Nelson).
21. See Chren, Landefeld, & Murray, Doctors, Drug Companies, and Gifts, 262 J. A.M.A. 3448
(1989) [hereinafter Chren]. See infra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
22. Prescriptions will only be honored if they are signed by licensed physicians, and federal
regulations on direct-to-consumer advertising limit the extent to which a patient would know
enough about a specific drug to ask her doctor to prescribe it. The FDA forbids most direct-to-
consumer marketing of prescription drugs. For a discussion of the FDA regulations, see Novitch,
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 39 FOOD DRUG COsMETIC L.J. 306, 306-07
(1984). The FDA excepts from this general rule advertisements that offer only price comparisons
and "institutional" advertisements. Id. See also Kessler & Pines, The Federal Regulation of Pre-
scription Drug Advertising And Promotion, 264 J. A.M.A. 2409, 2413 (1990). The FDA is most
opposed to product-specific consumer advertisements, but it permits these to appear on cable televi-
sion in medical programs that can also be viewed by other health care workers and consumers. In
regular programming or in non-medical jrint media, the FDA has relaxed its stance on ads that
name a particular complaint and instruct the consumer to see her physician for more information.
In these advertisements, the drug company may depict its company logo. Kessler & Pines, supra, at
2413.
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tantly improper activities. The danger of these seller-doctor relationships
is that they may create an underlying obligation between the doctor and
the pharmaceutical company without allowing the patient to make an
informed judgment about the suitability and credibility of the doctor's
prescribing choices. 23 This Note will identify the point on this contin-
uum at which the benefits of detailing end and the harms to the patient
begin.
A. The Impropriety of "Reward" Structures
The most controversial detailer practice involves offering "rewards"
to doctors who prescribe large amounts of a company drug. In 1986,
after the expiration of the seventeen-year patent on Inderal, Wyeth-
Ayerst had to compete with generic imitations of its successful drug to
reduce blood pressure. To succeed in the tougher market, the company
offered frequent-flyer miles on American Airlines to physicians who pre-
scribed the drug. Doctors who wrote fifty prescriptions would receive a
free round-trip ticket to any destination in the continental United
States.24
These reward structures pose serious ethical problems for the physi-
cian-patient relationship because of their potential to color the physi-
cian's prescribing choices. Moreover, even if no significant distortion
occurs, in a sense the doctor violates a duty to the patient by engaging in
a possibly conflicting relationship with a pharmaceutical company with-
out informing the patient.25
Other questionable and expensive detailing practices involve grant-
ing continuing medical education (CME) credits in exchange for drug
prescriptions and sponsoring conferences in which doctors are paid large
The propriety of direct-to-consumer marketing of prescription drugs has been vigorously de-
bated since the FDA requested a voluntary moratorium on all direct-to-consumer advertising in
1982 and lifted it, after investigation, in 1985. The FDA determined that its existing regulations on
advertising and labeling were sufficient to regulate consumer advertising. Id. Some argue that direct-
to-consumer advertising helps to promote a more informed public and enables some lay persons to
seek medical assistance for a condition that may have gone untreated. Others maintain that direct
advertising "interferes with the physician-patient relationship, confuses patients, puts pressure on
physicians to prescribe, and increases use unnecessarily." Id.
Congress, physicians, and even the pharmaceutical companies have stated their opposition to
direct-to-consumer advertising. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SUBCOMM. ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, STAFF REPORT ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG ADVERTISING TO
CONSUMERS, Gov't Printing Off. Pub. No. 38-556 (1984). Yet, drug companies have been stretching
the boundaries of permissibility under current FDA regulations. Kessler and Pines, supra, at 2413.
23. Courts have increasingly recognized a patient's right to control his medical care. In Cruzan
v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990), the Supreme Court affirmed this right by
recognizing a personal liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.
24. See Wilkes & Shuchman, supra note 1, at 89.
25. See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
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honoraria to speak and mention a drug of the sponsoring company.26
These conferences are frequently held in attractive locations, and guests
and their spouses are treated to fine meals, recreation, and entertainment
"in between" educational lectures.27 Janssen Pharmaceutical, a subsidi-
ary of Johnson & Johnson, used CME to market its new antihistamine,
granting credits to doctors who prescribed the drug and read the com-
pany monograph. 28
Continuing medical education is designed to force physicians to stay
abreast of new medical technologies. Many state licensing boards require
practicing physicians to complete a specific number of credits each year.
Although drug company sponsorship of classes can be useful to fund pro-
grams on new drug technologies, 29 pharmaceutical companies should not
have substantive control of the events. Simply, the danger is too great
that the drug companies' interest in promoting their products will out-
weigh their concern for educating doctors objectively about new medical
developments. Moreover, the entertainment activities should be no more
lavish than is necessary to provide a sufficient incentive for the doctor to
attend and learn about new health technologies. 30
Questionable promotional practices have backfired in some cases.
Motivated by an interest in ensuring that doctors prescribe the most cost-
effective drugs for the state's Medicaid patients, Massachusetts cracked
down on the frequent-flyer program. The state sued Wyeth-Ayerst and
settled for $195,000.31 The practices continue in other states, however,
and the offering of free, elegant excursions remains a staple of promo-
tional efforts. The AMA and PMA have passed regulations prohibiting
extravagant CME conferences that allow content control by drug compa-
26. Even the AMA opposes these questionable practices. In his testimony before the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Dr. Daniel Johnson, Vice Speaker of the AMA's
House of Delegates, expressed concern about the "undue influence from a gift with strings at-
tached." He described a scenario in which a company that donates funds to underwrite a CME
conference may want a role in "shaping the program, thereby undermining the objectivity and im-
partiality of the educational activity." Kennedy Hearings 1990, supra note 5, at 159 (testimony of
Dr. Daniel Johnson).
27. See Nelson, A Snorkel, a 5-1ron, and a Pen, 264 J. A.M.A. 742 (1990). Drug companies
spent $5 million on symposia in 1974 and $85 million in 1988. The locations now include resorts
such as Palm Springs, Monte Carlo, and Acapulco. The drug companies provide rooms, meals,
travel expenses, and, in some cases, cash honoraria as high as $1000 to physicians who attend.
Kennedy Hearings 1990, supra note 5, at 2 (opening statement of Senator Edward Kennedy (D-
Mass.)) [hereinafter Kennedy Statement].
28. See Wilkes & Shuchman, supra note 1, at 89.
29. See Randall, New Guidelines Expected in 1991 for Relationship of Continuing Education,
Financial Support, 264 J. A.M.A. 1080 (1990) (in the last 10 years, support from pharmaceutical
companies resulted in a five-fold increase in physician learning opportunities).
30. This argument is based on economic efficiency analysis. For a discussion of this contention,
see infra note 87-92 and accompanying text.
31. See Wilkes & Shuchman, supra note 1, at 89.
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nies,32 and the FDA may soon adopt similar regulations.3 3 Yet, even
after ruling out these obviously harmful activities, there remains an area
of uncertain behavior on the detailing continuum. Moderate gift-giving
and the provision of informational meal sessions for doctors are more
difficult to analyze. In these cases, the benefits of the physician/detailer
interaction may significantly outweigh the harm.
B. The More Troubling Area of Controversy
Activities and gifts that are not so extravagant as to be clearly im-
proper pose more serious ethical and economic questions. Critics have
waged two general attacks against these detailing activities. First, they
contend that money spent to woo physicians may result in corresponding
increases in prescription drug prices.34 Second, they argue that relation-
ships between drug companies and physicians taint the prescribing pro-
cess and prevent doctors from making objective assessments of the
optimal prescribing choices for their patients. Balanced against these
criticisms is the contention that detailers serve an important educational
goal of informing physicians about the newest technologies on the mar-
ket.3 5 It is most difficult to weigh these cross-purposes when detailers
avoid blatantly improper practices and, instead, provide only "non-obli-
gatory" gifts and informational lunches. The next two sections evaluate
the ethical and economic values of these more troubling instances and
provide a standard against which commentators should measure their
criticisms. At first glance, all detailing practices seem reprehensible;
however, the following analysis suggests that, within certain limitations,
detailing may be economically necessary to provide the health care con-
sumer with the most well-informed physician.
II. THE ETHICS OF GIFT-GIVING
Most attacks on the activities of detailers and the cost of the drug
company gifts suggest that doctors' relationships with detailers and drug
32. See infra text accompanying note 118.
33. See Peck & Rheinstein, FDA Regulation of Prescription Drug Advertising, 264 J. A.M.A.
2424, 2425 (1990) (editorial by two FDA representatives).
34. See Kennedy Statement, supra note 27, at 2. Hulstrand, Pharmaceutical Companies Should
Offer Reliable Information, Not Freebies, 46 AM. J. Hosp. PHARM. 703 (1989). Congresspersons,
doctors, and pharmacists assume that detailing increases consumer prices for drugs; however, see
infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the positive economic effects of detailing
in terms of providing drug companies with the necessary income from their innovation to support
tremendous research and development costs.
35. See McKinney, Schiedermayer, Lurie, Simpson, Goodman, & Rich, Attitudes of Internal
Medicine Faculty and Residents Toward Professional Interaction With Pharmaceutical Sales Repre-
sentatives, 264 J. A.M.A. 1693, 1695 (1990).
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companies distort physicians' prescribing choices. Some commentators
argue that the gift-giving itself creates an obligation on the part of the
physician to prescribe the drug company's product.3 6 Many physicians
agree that programs like Wyeth's, which directly reward physicians for
prescribing a drug, are unethical; however, more subtle practices like
sponsoring informational lunches and handing out engraved golf balls
may also be improper because they create an implicit obligatory relation-
ship between the doctor and the detailer.37 One commentator suggests
that "[i]nherent in the relationship is an obligation to respond to the gift:
this obligation may influence the physician's decisions with regard to pa-
tient care or possibly even erode the physician's character. 38 Two possi-
ble ethical problems are raised by a doctor's acceptance of a gift: (1) gifts
may increase the price of a product without the consent of the patient;
and (2) gift-giving may lead to the erosion of the medical profession's
commitment to serve the public. 39 These concerns will be addressed
separately.
A. Detailing Expenditures and Price Increases
The overriding ethical complaint about the relationship between de-
tailers and doctors is that it results in the spending of consumers' money
without their consent. Detailing expenditures, like advertising expendi-
tures in other industries, are passed on to the consumer in the form of
higher product prices. The next section will discuss the ways in which
this increase in price may be preferable to even higher increases if detail-
ing were impermissible. However, the pivotal ethical question remains:
Should the doctor be allowed to reap the costly benefits of detailing activ-
ities without the consent of the patient? Many patients are unaware of
these practices and, even if they know about detailing generally, they
rarely know about their doctor's specific contacts with detailers from var-
ious drug companies.
The underlying commercial relationship between doctors and detail-
ers seems particularly offensive in light of the power that doctors have
over the choices of their patients. Only the physician may enable a pa-
tient to obtain a prescription drug, and, in most cases, the patient lacks
the knowledge to evaluate a physician's prescribing decision. More than
perhaps any other profession, the doctor enjoys almost the blanket trust
36. See Chren, supra note 21, at 3448.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. These two effects are drawn from id. at 3449.
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of the patient.40 Drug prescribing is one of the most elusive medical
practices. Approximately 9600 drugs were on the market in 1984,41 and
each year the FDA approves about thirty new drugs and hundreds of
new applications or alterations of existing formulas.42 Many of these
products attack similar symptoms and diseases, and, although the con-
sumer could obtain information on the success rates and comparisons of
drugs through sources such as the Physicians' Desk Reference, this infor-
mation is often difficult for the lay person to comprehend. 43 The con-
sumer may be able to discover which drugs have proven to be
ineffective, 44 but she may not be able to distinguish between drugs that
have only marginally different effects (and possibly significantly disparate
prices). 45 Thus, the patient is frequently at the mercy of the doctor's
prescribing decisions.
The inability of patients to control doctors' prescribing choices and
to regulate the circumstances under which these choices are made evokes
40. The explosion of malpractice suits against doctors has eroded this power disparity to some
extent, but the fact remains that patients are often unable to evaluate the doctor's specific medical
decisions. Lay patients mainly sue when they experience a noticeable medical difficulty that they
attribute to the doctor's decisions.
41. See Krupka & Vener, Prescription Drug Advertising: Trends and Implications, 20 Soc. ScI.
MED. 191, 191 (1985).
42. See id.
43. PHYSICIANs' DESK REFERENCE (43rd ed. 1989). The PDR outlines the description, phar-
macology, precautions, and adverse reactions for every drug on the market. In an entry for
Dramamine, a drug frequently used to alleviate motion sickness, the publisher issues the following
warning:
Caution should be used when Dramamine is taken in conjunction with certain antibiotics
that may cause ototoxicity, since Dramamine is capable of masking ototoxic symptoms and
an irreversible state may be reached.
Id. at 2011. This language is extremely foreign to most lay persons, and it seems unlikely that the
patient would interpret this passage to say that if you take Dramamine with certain antibiotics, you
could suffer permanent ear damage.
44. No one could ignore the controversy surrounding the use of the "quack" cancer cure, Lae-
trile, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The FDA prohibited distribution of the drug in interstate
commerce and launched a massive publicity campaign to dispel claims of its therapeutic effects.
Cooper, Laetrile-Of Choice and Effectiveness, 38 FOOD, DRUG & CosM. L.J. 417, 427 (1983). In
1979, the Supreme Court supported the FDA's prohibition. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S.
544, 555 (1979). Many doctors and patients continued to urge its use, despite a dearth of scientific
evidence of its curative effects. Cooper, supra, at 436.
45. In 1989, the Senate Special Committee on Aging made disparaging determinations of the
medical value of new drugs on the market during the 1980s. The study utilized a rating scale that
grades the therapeutic potential of new drugs from A (important) to C (little/none). The study
made the following finding:
Eighty-four percent (84%) of the 348 new drugs brought to market by the 25 largest U.S.
drug manufacturers between 1981 and 1988 were evaluated by the federal Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) as "C"-rated, having "little or no" potential for therapeutic gain
over existing drug therapies. For every "important" new drug marketed... 24 "C"-rated
new drugs... were brought to market.
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the patient's liberty interest and her informed consent to the medical
treatment she receives. A cardinal premise of the medical profession is
that
[t]he patient's right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only if
the patient possesses enough information to enable an intelligent
choice.... The physician has an ethical obligation to help the patient
make choices from among the therapeutic alternatives consistent with
good medical practice. 46
However, this broad view of open information cannot practically be
adopted without exception. Doctors make medical care decisions for a
variety of reasons, not all of which are specified for the patient. Cer-
tainly, if a doctor is prescribing a drug made by a company because of
the commercial efforts of that company, the patient has a right to know,
and the doctor has a duty to inform. However, requiring the doctor to
reveal ties with a drug company simply because those ties exist goes be-
yond the meaning and the goals of the informed consent doctrine.
The thrust of the informed consent doctrine is that the patient has a
right to make serious medical decisions, not that she has a right to know
each variable that affects a doctor's prescribing choice. Most impor-
tantly, the doctrine requires that a patient be permitted to turn down
medical care if she wishes.47 Nothing in the doctor-patient relationship
would prevent this result. Even if the patient knows less about drugs
than the doctor, she is free to reject the prescription and to seek a second
opinion. Moreover, if the value to the patient of having a more informed
physician outweighs the negative commercial effects these pharmaceuti-
cal gifts might have on the physician's prescribing habits, the ethical
harm of the absence of complete consent is minimized. I will attempt to
prove this latter suggestion below in order to alleviate the sting of the
ethical argument relating to consent.
B. Erosion of Public Confidence
It is possible to argue that, even without an ethical objection based
on consent, detailing is undesirable because it destroys the doctor's com-
mitment to prescribe drugs with the interest of the patient, not the drug
company, in mind. Because of this possible breach of the physician's
duty and the view that these types of gifts create at least the appearance
of impropriety, professionals in other industries are forbidden from ac-
46. CURRENT OPINIONS: THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERI-
CAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 8.08 (1989).
47. This is the essence of the decision in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct
2841 (1990). The plaintiffs were fighting for the patient's right to reject life-sustaining care.
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cepting comparable incentives.48 Federal government employees, includ-
ing physicians at Veterans Administration hospitals, may not accept gifts
from companies whose products or services they are using,49 and federal
judges may not accept gifts from persons whose interests have come or
are likely to come before the court.50 A survey of manufacturing firms
showed that fifty percent of the firms did not permit their employees to
accept gifts other than pens, pads, or items of comparable value.
Twenty-four percent of the firms permitted acceptance of gifts up to fifty
dollars in value, but only on an occasional basis.51
The ethical implications of gifts to physicians seem uniquely contro-
versial. The doctor exerts control in decisions that directly affect the
patient's health. There is some sense in which the doctor owes an ethical
duty to place the patient's health as the highest priority and to approach
this duty from a scientific rather than a commercial perspective.52 Medi-
cal care is not composed of clear-cut, scientific decisions,53 but because
that makes it more difficult to evaluate doctors' choices objectively, the
physician owes a duty to patients to use the best scientific tools available
in prescribing drugs. Patients have few inexpensive ways to reevaluate
prescribing choices. For these reasons, as well as the strong and perma-
nent effects of physician decisions, the AMA ethical code, state laws, and
court decisions have held doctors to a higher standard of care than other
professionals.
It is conceivable that even small detailing gifts or informal lunches
may marginally influence doctors' views of certain drug products; how-
ever, concluding that these practices are ethically wrong rests on one
necessary finding: that the relationship harms the patient. If the doctor
is influenced by detailers' information and incentives, but the influence
48. See Kennedy Hearings 1990, supra note 5, at 217 (testimony of Richard J. MeMurray).
49. Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. § 306 (1964-1965), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. § 201
(1988).
50. See American Bar Association, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, reprinted in PATTERSON & METZLOFF, supra note 8, at Appendix A,
A-45.
51. See Bird, Gift-giving and Gift-taking in Industrial Companies, 18 INDUS. MARKETING
MGMT. 91 (1989).
52. This principal has guided conceptions of the physician's duty since the days of Hippocrates.
Plato said,
[T]he free-born doctor... talks with the patient himself and with his friends, and thus both
learns himself from the sufferers and imparts instruction to them, so far as possible, and he
gives no prescription until he has gained the patient's consent, and only then, while secur-
ing the patient's continued docility by means of persuasion, does he attempt to complete
the task of restoring him to health.
PLATO, LAWS Book IV, Vol X, 309 (R. Burry, trans. 1967).
53. See A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING
COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE 1-6 (1980).
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has a positive effect on patient care, these ethical arguments carry less
weight. The following section will examine the business side of the phar-
maceutical industry and describe the circumstances in which detailing
practices, including doctor visits and gift-giving, may be an economically
necessary means of apprising physicians of the most modem drug tech-
nologies on the market.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF DETAILING
Intimately related to an ethical evaluation of drug company detail-
ing activities is the question of whether these activities actually alter the
doctor's choices and whether this alteration harms the patient in terms of
bad prescribing choices and higher-priced drugs. Some commentators
suggest that detailing freebies must certainly alter the physicians' deci-
sions because "'[n]o drug company gives away its shareholders' money
in an act of disinterested generosity.' ",54 This influence may create con-
flicts of interest that operate at the expense of proper and cost-effective
prescribing for patients. But, the efficacy of these suspected effects de-
pends on proof that detailing activities change demand for drugs in a way
that harms the patient. The simple argument that no company would
waste their money is unsatisfactory, and this conclusory approach begs
other questions. First, do PSRs actually effect changes in demand for the
pharmaceutical products they tout? Second, are these alterations in de-
mand (evidenced by increased prescribing) linked to the promotional or
informational aspect of detailing activities? Third, are these promotional
activities and their demand effects essential to ensure the vitality of the
pharmaceutical market and the incentive for innovation?
A. Detailers' Effect on Demand for Drug Products
A central determinant of the economic efficiency of detailing is the
effect the promotional activities have on physicians' demand for the pro-
moted products. Evidence regarding the impact of detailing efforts on
physicians' prescribing choices varies. One study, conducted by pharma-
cists at the University of North Carolina, found that no correlation ex-
isted between demand and increases in detailing or journal advertising
expenditures.55 In comparing various similar products classified as either
diuretics or benzodiazepines, the study found that the promotional elas-
54. Chren, supra note 21, at 3449, quoting Rawlins, Doctors and the Drug Makers, LANCET 76-
78 (1984).
55. See Mackowiak & Gagnon, supra note 2, at 1191.
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ticity was zero for both primary demand for the drug class and selective
demand for a particular product.56
Other studies suggest, however, that detailers may be the first con-
tact a physician has with a new product and that doctors may be moti-
vated to prescribe the drug, at least on a trial basis, as a result of a single
meeting.57 Physicians conducted similar investigations in Australian
hospitals and reached similar conclusions. Doctors reported that detail-
ers, unlike professional journals and colleagues, were usually the first
source of information about a new product.58 However, doctors also re-
ported that later discussions with their colleagues played a legitimizing
role in their decision to prescribe the drug.59 Further, the study con-
cluded that older doctors and solo practitioners are more likely to rely on
the "passive information" received in detailing calls than to spend their
valuable time seeking out objective information in professional
journals.60
The most interesting finding, resulting from a study by scientists at
Michigan State University, is that the promotional elasticities for
pharmaceuticals may be higher with newly approved drugs that have un-
56. See id. at 1195. Promotional elasticity is a measure of the percentage change in demand for
a product corresponding with an increase in promotional expenditures. A promotional elasticity of
zero indicates that detailing was ineffective in increasing the demand for the promoted drugs.
57. See Christensen & Bush, Drug Prescribing: Patents, Problems and Proposals, 15 Soc. Sc.
MED. 343 (1981). Another study conducted at the Harvard Medical School attempted to identify
the demand effects of promotions by objective methods instead of physician surveys. The authors
maintained that most of the research in the area relied heavily on self-reporting as a major source of
data, introducing a significant bias. The Harvard researchers first surveyed a random sample of
doctors, asking them about the degree to which detailers influenced their prescribing choices. They
then compared this data to objective records of those doctors' prescribing habits. Evaluating the
most frequently prescribed drugs, the extent of their promotion, and their medical effectiveness, the
researchers found that doctors frequently make "irrational" drug choices, despite the availability of
ample empirical evidence counseling otherwise. In evaluating these poor choices, researchers found
that "commercial channels" (advertisements, detail personnel) presented a message of efficacy and
reliability, whereas "scientific channels" (published reports of clinical trials or review articles)
presented a message of minimal efficacy or total uselessness. For a discussion of this study, see
Avorn, Chen, & Hartley, Scientific versus Commercial Sources of Influence on the Prescribing Behav-
ior of Physicians, 73 AM. J. MEDICINE 4, 4 (July 1982).
Most of the literature contradicts this finding, and the conclusions can perhaps be explained by
assuming that these improper choices were simply those of doctors selecting a new drug on a trial
basis.
58. See Peay & Peay, Differences Among Practitioners in Patterns of Preference for Information
Sources in the Adoption of New Drugs, 18 Soc. ScI. MED. 1019 (1984). There is certainly some bias
built in to this study as well; however, this finding is not particularly suspect. A doctor is not being
self-laudatory when she admits that she learns of drugs first from a detailer instead of a journal
article or colleague. Because these comments are not likely to be in the surveyed physicians' best
interest, they seem relatively trustworthy.
59. See id. at 1024.
60. Id.
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certain therapeutic effects. 61 If promotions are most effective with new
products about which physicians and the market in general are uncer-
tain, the argument can be made that detailers, particularly because of
their direct and responsive contact with physicians, truly provide doctors
with information that fills the gap of uncertainty. Detailers seem to serve
an educational role of keeping the physician up-to-date on products
about which she is not yet aware. 62
This information is particularly relevant to an understanding of the
role of drug promotion in the health care industry, which prevents any
imitation of a product until the seventeen-year patent expires. 63 This ex-
tended patent period prompts bolstered criticisms that the industry poses
barriers to new entrants by highly promoting protected products. 64
However, if promotional detailing favors new drug products the most,
entry is in fact enhanced because the ability to meet directly with physi-
cians provides avenues of entry for a drug manufacturer who has an in-
61. See Krupka & Vener, supra note 41, at 191.
62. Although it might seem merely intuitive that any type of advertising is more effective for
new products than old, this is not the case in an industry in which name recognition can be so
important. Shiny "reminder" ads in medical journals-focusing only on an older company's name
and ignoring specifics of new products-are useless to new companies with unfamiliar products.
Detailing is uniquely helpful to the latter businesses, and it ensures that entry will be somewhat open
in an industry characterized by high market concentration within therapeutic areas. See supra note
8. New companies have access to doctors, and the evidence indicates that access is an effective
marketing tool because of the information exchange that occurs. See supra notes 56-59 and accom-
panying text.
63. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). In 1983, Congress amended the patent statutes to add five years to
the patent period for drugs submitted for FDA approval after 1976. Pub. L. No. 98-127, § 4(a), 97
Stat. 832 (1983) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 155A (1988)). One year later, Congress passed the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1598 (1984)
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156), providing long-term answers to drug manufacturers' complaints that
the lengthy FDA approval process deprived them of the financial benefits of exclusive marketing and
production during the patent term.
The Act extended the term of patents for drug products that had been subject to a regulatory
review period before commercial marketing. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4). The patents for these products
are extended by "the time equal to the regulatory review period for the approved product .. " Id.
at § 156(c).
However, Congress passed the 1984 changes with provisions that simplified and shortened the
FDA approval process for generic drug products. Title I of the amendments provided, with impor-
tant conditions, for market approval for certain new drugs shown to be "bioequivalent" to previ-
ously approved drugs, 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(1988). Therefore, while gaining a few years from the
patent restoration, the drug companies lost a few years of exclusivity to generic drug companies that
could gain entry sooner after the expiration of the patent of the name-brand product. P. FELDSTEIN,
supra note 1, at 465.
64. An industry characterized by large companies with significant market shares often contains
barriers to entry for new firms. This characteristic is viewed critically because it is often seen as an
indicator of monopoly power among the market leaders, enabling them to set prices higher than
those in a competitive market. P. FELDSTEIN, supra note I, at 440-45.
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novative product without an established name-brand or proven market
successes.
65
B. Price Response to Detailing Activities
Assuming that there is at least a partial demand effect from PSR
efforts, a separate question is whether critics are correct in assuming that
detailing activities raise the prices of drug products. The answer to this
question, combined with the demand effects, will help clarify the conclu-
sions regarding the economic soundness of detailing expenditures.
1. Price Elasticity for Prescription Drugs. Promotional expendi-
tures are generally passed on to the consumer in markets for "inelastic"
goods. A market is characterized as inelastic if consumers alter their
purchasing behavior only minimally in response to a price change. The
demand for prescription drugs-like that for food and other necessities-
is characterized by low price elasticities; thus the prescription drug de-
mand is inelastic because prescribers do not pay for the products and
because consumers are not generally selective in purchasing the drugs
doctors prescribe. 66
Demand is even less elastic for drugs with unique therapeutic effects
and patent protection; yet, after a patent for a product expires and new
generic and "copycat" products challenge the prior legal monopoly of
the first product, demand for that product becomes more elastic. Pa-
tients will prefer and pharmacists will more likely suggest a lower-priced
product with the same therapeutic effects. 67 As a result, drug companies
charge higher prices and make increased profits during the patent period,
while shifting most promotion costs to the consumers. When new firms
enter the therapeutic market, however, competitive pressures will not al-
low companies to pass on these costs. The market will not bear prices
that reflect marketing costs when there are discount sellers who charge
lower prices. Profits for all companies will become "normal," character-
izing a competitive market in which free entry has occurred and profits
have been reduced to what they would be in most other industries. 68
65. This view has challenged an older notion that promotional expenses secure the monopolis-
tic powers of the larger pharmaceutical companies. See, e.g., P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 446-48
(stating that advertising serves the dual purposes of providing information and achieving entry for
new products); Leffier, Persuasion or Information.? The Economics of Prescription Drug Advertising,
24 J. LAW & ECON. 45, 60-68 (1981) (arguing that because physicians do not respond to advertising
in the same way as consumers, the older marketing theory rests on false premises).
66. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 381-85.
67. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 449.
68. See Schnee & Caglorcan, The Changing Pharmaceutical Research and Development Envi-
ronment, in THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 107 (C. Lindsey ed. 1978).
Vol. 1991:206]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Although the overall demand for prescription drugs is inelastic, in-
creased numbers of suppliers may make the demand for specific products
more elastic. The explosion in the generic drug industry exemplifies this
process. Providing lower-priced alternatives for brand-named products
after the expiration of a patent term allows the patient to choose between
two pricing options at the suggestion of her pharmacist. The manufac-
turers of brand-named products are not permitted to raise prices above
the "normal" profit level and the company that once held a valuable pat-
ent earns a lower rate of return on the now "public" technology. 69
2. Evaluating the Harm of Increased Costs. Higher costs during
the patent period may not be as harmful as they initially appear, how-
ever. Economic analysis suggests that drug company promotion,
through the direct sales tactics of detailers, may be economically neces-
sary to permit the companies to engage in the research and development
(R&D) that often result in groundbreaking pharmaceutical innovations.
If this is true, the consumer should accept the cost increases that result
from promotions in order to reap a net benefit through increased R&D of
drug technology for the market.
Pharmaceutical companies spend between 10.5 and 15 percent of
their assets on research and development for new products. 70 One esti-
mate is that the industry will spend $8.2 billion on pharmaceutical R&D
this year. R&D expenditures have doubled every five years since 1970,71
largely because of the length of time that it takes to bring a new drug to
market.72 Pharmaceutical R&D is a tedious process, requiring extensive
expenditures of time and money, yet uncovering very few successful
products. Therefore, when a company develops what seems to be an in-
novative chemical compound with unique therapeutic applications, it
must recoup enough of its costs to pay for its numerous and expensive
failed attempts.73 Moreover, a company with a new product must recoup
69. See M. STATMAN, supra note 6, at 65-66 (1983).
70. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 446.
71. See Kennedy Hearings 1990, supra note 5, at 163 (testimony of Gerald Mossinghofl, Presi-
dent of the PMA).
72. See id. One recent study found that, on average, it costs $230 million and takes more than
twelve years to bring a new prescription pharmaceutical from discovery to development to FDA
market approval.
73. Congress scrutinized the validity of many of these R&D expenditures in a 1989 report. See
AGING REPORT, supra note 5, at 17 (suggesting that, in most cases, R&D has produced many less-
than-significant therapeutic gains). However, the studies used were conducted by the FDA, and
other analyses depict the value of R&D as much more significant. One example of the value of a new
R&D success is the development ofTissue Plasminogen Activator (TPA) by Genentech. Genentech
researchers used a new method of DNA recombination and produced an extremely valuable product
for dissolving blood clots in blood vessels. The product made Genentech an overnight blue-chip
company, having taken over the market of two other drugs that were not as successful in achieving
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these costs during the seventeen or eighteen years of the patent term,
before the generic drug makers assume their portion of the market. At
the same time, producers run the risk that another manufacturer will
create a more effective patentable product for the same illness.74 This
entire process has an extremely short fuse, and the need for companies to
expend large sums for rapid-fire marketing is obvious. If direct market-
ing to physicians were prohibited, drug companies may not be able to
afford significant expenditures for new product innovation.
Although this analysis suggests that increasing the patent term
would lead to similar gains, this conclusion is off the mark because the
real issue is market awareness. Patent term extension is only significant
to the extent that a pharmaceutical company can make physicians aware
of the unique benefits of a new product. Detailing most efficiently ac-
complishes this goal. Extending the patent term would merely admit
that, absent detailing, there are a certain number of additional years the
government should give for drug companies to exclusively market a drug
that will take a certain number of years to catch on. If the drug is a
breakthrough of immediate benefit to patients, this move would probably
mean that patients would be denied these therapeutic gains for a number
of years. On the other hand, allowing detailing ensures that physicians
are made aware of the product as soon as it is approved for market sales.
Without the direct line to physicians, drugs created by established firms
would have a promotional edge over those created by lesser-known com-
panies. Extending the patent term would only enhance this monopolistic
power without concomitant gains, but the continued allowance of detail-
ing activities (within a range of acceptability) encourages free entry by
new companies and quick physician awareness of new technologies.
The dearth of other marketing channels forces companies to rely on
direct physician contact with d!etailers to explain the viability of new
this therapeutic effect. Those products used a more common method of producing drugs from bacte-
ria extracts. TPA is much more effective than the two older products, and heart attack patients now
experience fewer side-effects. For a discussion of TPA, see LaGanga, The Times 100: The Best
Performing Companies in California, Los Angeles Times, Apr. 3, 1991, at 21, col. 1. Scientists re-
cently called into question whether TPA was actually a scientific innovation. See Saltus, Promotion
of Heart Drug is Questioned, Boston Globe, Mar. 6, 1991, at 1, col. 1. Regardless of the inroads the
drug may have made in its therapeutic area, the technique of DNA recombination used by
Genentech will certainly prove to be a valuable method for further research and development.
74. See Prescription Drug Cost Increases: Factors and Trends. Hearings Before the Subcommit-
tee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 262-64 (1987) (testimony of Gerald Mossinghoftf). See also P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at
453 ("The uncertainty of returns to research and development expenditures contains an element of
risk that is perhaps greater than in other industries."); Joglekar and Paterson, A Closer Look at the
Returns and Risks of Pharmaceutical R & D, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 153, 175 (1986) (only one out of
every three new chemical entities offers a better return than an investment in a bond, "and the odds
of exceeding it by an appreciable degree are small indeed").
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drug technologies. Without this avenue, companies with new technolo-
gies-especially newer, small companies that cannot sell products merely
on the basis of their name or prior achievements-will be unable to
devote the funds and efforts necessary to make breakthroughs if they
cannot successfully market the products. Therefore, the huge expendi-
tures from detailing incurred by consumers result in a net benefit to pa-
tients. First, these costs may be less than they would otherwise be if the
company recouped fewer R&D losses due to an inability to market its
newer products successfully. Second, and more importantly, promo-
tional costs of detailing may be necessary to permit and encourage drug
manufacturers to invest in innovation. 75
C. Minimizing Barriers to Entry Through Detailing
Evidence that detailing expenditures are incorporated in drug prices
does not prove that these outlays economically disadvantage health con-
sumers. Most critics of high promotional expenditures contend that
pharmaceutical companies operate under monopolistic conditions with
correspondingly astronomical profits.76 They assume the high promo-
tional expenditures serve as barriers to entry that would correct these
profit levels. Under this view, detailing expenditures would work to the
75. For an excellent explanation of this counter-intuitive argument, see M. STATMAN, supra
note 6, at 62-65.
76. It is tempting merely to look at the accounting rates-of-return of pharmaceutical companies
and to conclude that their profits are disproportionate in relation to other industries. However,
given the risks of research and development as well as the increasing burdens the FDA places on
drug companies for product approval, the corrected rates of return are not comparatively excessive.
Table 2 supports this conclusion.
TABLE 2
AVERAGE ACCOUNTING AND CORRECTED RATES OF RETURN ON NET WORTH, 1959-1973
(Percentages)
Accounting Corrected
Industry Rates of Return Rates of Return Difference
Pharmaceuticals 18.3 12.9 -5.4
Electrical machinery 13.3 10.1 -3.2
Foods 11.8 10.6 -1.2
Petroleum 11.2 10.8 -0.4
Chemicals 10.6 9.1 -1.5
Paper 10.5 10.1 -0.4
Office machinery 10.5 9.9 -0.6
Motor vehicles 10.5 9.2 -1.3
Rubber products 10.1 8.7 -1.4
Aerospace 9.2 7.4 -1.8
Ferrous metals 7.6 7.3 -0.3
Average 11.2 9.6 -1.6
Variance 7.5 2.5
P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 454 (citing K. CLARKSON, INTANGIBLE CAPITAL AND RATES OF
RETURN 64 (1977)).
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disadvantage of the consumer, forcing drug prices above their equilib-
rium level and robbing the public of pro-competitive innovation in the
industry.
Newer analyses of promotional expenditures suggest that high pro-
motional expenditures operate not as a barrier to entry and competition,
however, but as a welcome mat for new entrants in the pharmaceutical
industry. 77 Newer studies have found a positive relationship between
high promotional spending and entry, concluding that promotions have a
pro-competitive effect in the industry.78 Patents and R&D costs are seen
as the greatest barriers to new firms in an industry that relies on surprise
solutions to familiar diseases. However, the combination of patents and
promotions seems likely to provide incentives for small companies to
pursue their innovative research approaches to the greatest extent possi-
ble. Small companies are assured that an innovation will be safe from
imitators, and they know they can effectively vie with the established
firms for the physicians' time. This view is supported by the fact that
new companies and established companies with new products detail un-
familiar products more than those with well-known reputations among
doctors.79 The guarantee of continued innovation and rapid deployment
helps to ensure that the patient will receive the most technologically ad-
vanced drug in the most efficient manner.
IV. THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF DETAILING ACTIvITIEs
The economic analysis of detailing practices suggests that there is a
positive element to the expenditures and that drug companies should not
be precluded from these types of direct marketing strategies. Because of
this direct, interactive contact, detailers can also serve to educate physi-
cians on new drug technologies. Moreover, the informational transac-
tions that occur during physician/detailer meetings seem to be the most
efficient means of communicating news of these innovations.80 Health
care economist Kenneth Leffler maintains that detailing visits are catered
specifically to the doctor's practice, allowing the physician to receive in-
formation from and ask questions of a salesperson who specializes in the
doctor's field. Moreover, Leffler suggests, detailing is more effective in
77. See Leffler, supra note 65, at 67; P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 448.
78. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 448.
79. Interview with Charles Cato, Hospital Sales Representative for Eli Lilly & Company in
North Carolina, in Durham, North Carolina (April 8, 1991).
80. The health value of directly promoting new drug technologies can be significant. One com-
mentator suggests that if the use of tuberculosis drugs had spread as rapidly as the Salk vaccine,
80,600 lives would have been saved. Similarly, if major tranquilizers had been more heavily pro-
moted, 645 million patient days in the hospital may have been eliminated. S. PELTZMAN, REGULA-
TION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION (1974).
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disseminating information than journal advertising or other promotional
practices of the pharmaceutical companies. Journal advertising focuses
on providing doctors with quick, slick reminders about familiar drugs,
but physicians are unaware of many of the newer, detailed drugs. The
salesperson must provide information along with any freebies she may
wish to leave behind.81
Detailing visits are also more efficient than surveys of literature on a
specific drug area. Keeping abreast of new information is extremely
time-consuming,82 and the detailer makes sure the doctor is at least
aware of the new product. Not only does the detailer serve this first
informational purpose, she also may give the doctor copies of recently
published drug reviews, allowing the physician to confirm the detailer's
sales pitch. This process of awareness and objective corroboration helps
to ensure that doctors know about the newest technologies on the mar-
ket. This perspective is also economically wise. Evidence indicates that
although the reduction of drug company promotional expenditures may
decrease drug prices to consumers by as much as five percent, the savings
would be offset by an additional cost to doctors of replacing that infor-
mation. This cost would certainly be borne by the consumer.83
The most serious concern regarding this educational role is that de-
tailers and their companies may serve their financial goals before serving
the more ethical interest in telling the truth about their products. Some
commentators suggest that drug companies hire and train their detailers
by placing as much emphasis on qualities like sales talent as they do on
drug knowledge. Studies of want-ads for pharmaceutical sales represent-
atives and PSR training handbooks show that selling is the primary mis-
sion.84 Consider the instructions that Merck issued to its representatives
during its indomethacin (Indocid) campaign:
Tell 'em [doctors] again, and again, and again. Tell 'em until they are
sold and stay sold .... Take off the kid gloves .... Now every extra
bottle of 100 Indocid you sell is worth an extra $2.80 in incentive pay-
ments. Go get it. Pile it in!!!8 5
Another study found that only four of ninety-one advertisements for de-
tailers stated knowledge of drugs as an advantage. Experience in busi-
ness was considered suitable, and on-the-job training, a good salary, and
a company car were emphasized. 86 Additionally, detailers are normally
sent to see high-prescribing physicians. Doctors who write the largest
81. See Leffler, supra note 65, at 47, 54.
82. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 447.
83. See SCHWARTZMAN, INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 202 (1976).
84. See Lexchin, supra note 15, at 665-68.
85. M. SILVERMAN & P. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS, AND POLITICS 62 (1974).
86. See Lexchin, supra note 15, at 666.
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number of prescriptions receive the most visits from detailers. An AMA
study found that physicians who wrote one to ten prescriptions per week
saw 2.33 detailers per week, whereas those who wrote over 150 prescrip-
tions weekly had received 8 visits.8 7
None of these findings should be particularly surprising. Pharma-
ceutical companies are obviously interested in boosting profits and divi-
dends to their stockholders. But even if a potential conflict of interest
exists between the desire for profit and the interest in creating and mar-
keting therapeutic drugs, the real issue is whether detailers provide truth-
ful information to doctors. The evidence supports the conclusion that
detailers and drug companies have strong incentives to be honest in their
dealings with doctors.88 Because of a dual interest in securing future
business and remaining within the boundaries of allowable advertising
under the FDA regulations,8 9 detailers have an interest in accurately
presenting the positive and negative characteristics of their drugs.
Detailers and drug companies have a strong financial incentive to
tell the truth about the products they promote. If the detailer gives in-
correct information, he runs the risk of losing access to physicians or an
entire hospital, as well being brought to court on fraud charges-either
by the physician or the patient. The industry has responded to these
incentives by giving rigorous scientific training to new sales representa-
tives. In a recent meeting between sales trainers from six major pharma-
ceutical companies, 90 industry representatives said they are spending
large sums of money to train each detailer to be a combination of a scien-
tist, a business strategist, and a communicator. 91 The industry represent-
atives said a number of factors have forced them to concentrate more on
educating detailers to interact with doctors on a professional level. These
factors include increased pressure from consumers and physicians and
heightened complexity of the drug market itself.92
If we assume that the drug companies' incentive to provide accurate
information is strong enough, non-obligatory gifts may be seen as effi-
cient ways to compensate for the doctor's low interest in staying com-
pletely abreast of new drug developments. Therefore, detailer "baubles"
are not gratuitous; they serve to "bring the doctor to the table" and to
87. See H. WALKER, MARKET POWER AND PRICE LEVELS IN THE ETHICAL DRUG MARKET
74 (1971).
88. See Leffler, supra note 65, at 47, 54.
89. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
90. Parke-Davis, Abbott Laboratories, Pfizer Labs, Bristol-Myers, Upjohn Company, and
Syntex Labs.
91. See Wilson, Training Sales Reps 1990s Style, 25 MED. MARKETING & MEDIA 16 (October
1990).
92. See id.
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enable her to reap the knowledge that best serves the interests of her
patients. The doctor may still objectively evaluate the pharmaceutical
merits of a drug after the PSR has left the office.
This efficiency analysis illuminates the exact point on the detailing
continuum at which regulators should begin to restrict the activities of
detailers. Non-obligatory gifts used to encourage the physician to further
educate herself about a drug are legitimate and beneficial to the con-
sumer. However, incentives like the Wyeth "frequent-prescriber" plan,
that reward doctors ex post for prescribing specified quantities of a drug,
should not be permitted. Obligatory freebies encourage the doctor to
consider the benefit to her of prescribing the drug as part of the thera-
peutic benefit to the patient. This skews the physician's prescribing
choice. However, inasmuch as detailing activities involve conversation
about drugs between the detailer and the doctor, the educational pur-
poses of detailing are well-served.
Informational detailing calls provide a service to the patient in a
variety of direct and indirect ways: (1) the physician saves time and
money by quickly learning information from the PSR, and his savings of
time should be reflected in lower hourly costs to the patient; (2) the phy-
sician becomes aware of the newest innovations in drug therapy; and (3)
the consumer reaps the benefit of a practice that helps to ensure pro-
competitive entry of new companies with innovative products.
These benefits however, do not explain the economic necessity of
non-informational interaction between doctors and detailers. Yet, there
is a clear economic purpose to these freebies. Certainly, if the drug com-
panies could succeed by conveying information alone without offering
gifts or meals to doctors, they would reduce their detailing staff and ab-
sorb the gifts and honoraria into company profits. However, Leffler
notes that the drug companies must provide incentives beyond price re-
duction to increase demand. Price elasticity of drug products is limited
because the doctor is unresponsive to price changes he will not bear.
Thus, the companies must engage in non-price competition. Companies
may merely choose to provide information, and doctors who are strongly
interested in the marginal health benefits to their patients may be moti-
vated by this alone. But because the average doctor may not totally be
motivated by this or by the threat of malpractice suits, the companies
provide added benefits to induce doctors to learn more about new drugs.
Therefore, the goal of any regulation should be to allow detailing that
provides educational and economic values, while avoiding obligatory de-
tailing that does not contribute to innovation or heightened physician
awareness. Congress, the FDA, industry organizations, doctors, and
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hospitals should work to identify this middle ground and enforce it with
external controls and self-regulation.
V. REGULATION OF DETAILERS
A. The Federal Food and Drug Administration
Although the FDA has not explicitly exerted regulatory control
over the activities of detailers, it regularly exercises and increases the
scope of its power over prescription drug advertising. Technically, the
FDA can regulate only prescription drug promotional activities that fall
within the legal definitions of "labeling" or "advertising," but the FDA
has broadly defined its authority to include virtually any material issued
by or sponsored by a drug manufacturer. 93 Detailers' representations
about drug products implicitly fall within the FDA's jurisdiction.94 The
definitions of labeling and advertising have been viewed as covering "vir-
tually all information-disseminating activities by or on behalf of a pre-
scription drug manufacturer;" 95 however, there is a general statutory
construction that suggests that these definitions are intended to be re-
stricted to written material. 96 Guided by the statute, the FDA has ab-
stained from regulating detailing, but the road seems paved for the FDA
to exert control over oral detailing interactions. 97
93. See Kessler & Pines, supra note 22, at 2409. The Act defines "labeling" as any written,
printed, or graphic matter upon or accompanying the drug. 21 U.S.C. § 321(k) (1988). To be con-
strued as labeling, the material need not physically accompany the product, but merely "supplement
or explain it." Brochures, calendars, mailing pieces, exhibits, detailing pieces, and books used to
promote the sale of a product are considered labeling by the FDA. 21 C.F.R. § 202.11)(2) (1990).
See also Kessler & Pines, supra note 22, at 2410-12.
The Act does not define "advertisement," but the FDA generally views anything (other than
labeling) that promotes a drug product and that is sponsored by a manufacturer as advertising. Id.
at 2410.
94. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988)), granted the FDA jurisdiction over labeling for all drugs,
both prescription and over-the-counter. Originally, the Federal Trade Commission had jurisdiction
over all drug advertising. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History
and its Substantive Provisions, 1939 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. (Winter) 2, 13. In 1962, Congress
transferred jurisdiction over the advertising of prescription drugs to the FDA. Drug Amendments
of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 131, 76 Stat. 780, 791-92 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
352(n)(1988)) [hereinafter Drug Amendments of 1962].
95. Drug Amendments of 1962, supra note 94, at 791-792.
96. The statute giving the FDA power over advertising uses the terms "advertisements,"
"printed," and "published" to describe the regulated substance. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1988).
97. Two FDA representatives wrote an editorial specifically stating that "[i]n the near future,
the FDA plans to come forward with new guidelines for comment discussing direct-to-consumer
adverting, industry-sponsored continuing education, and press releases." Peck & Rheinstein, FDA
Regulation of Prescription Drug Advertising, 264 J. A.M.A. 2424, 2424 (1990). The expansion into
CME regulation indicates that the FDA, even without specific congressional endorsement, may in-
crease its control over advertising to include oral promotions by detailers and drug company speak-
ers at conferences. Regulation of physician detailing is a logical next step.
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The FDA regulations require that, in advertising or labeling, drug
manufacturers include a "brief summary" of the product and present a
"fair balance" of the positive and negative drug characteristics. 98 This
latter guideline demands that the companies include a description of the
risks and benefits that can affect a doctor's prescribing choice.99 The
restrictions clearly affect the behavior of drug companies and their sales
trainers, but the FDA should go further to explicitly outline standards of
propriety for detailing practices. The subsequent sections discuss the
way in which the FDA should work with Congress and industry groups
to effectively regulate in this area.
B. Congress
During the last twenty years, Congress has taken a few strong steps
to restrict the detailing activities of pharmaceutical companies operating
in the U.S. In 1973, Representative John Dingell and Senator Edward
Kennedy began an inquiry into detailing practices that resulted in the
98. Section 502(n) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, added by the Drug Amendments of
1962, supra note 94, at 1050-51, requires that advertisements include a "true statement" of the
"established name," "formula," and "such other information in brief summary relating to the drug's
side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness" as the FDA requires by regulation. 21 U.S.C.
§ 352(n) (1988). The FDA has concluded that the "true statement" requirement is violated if adver-
tising is false or misleading, fails to reveal material facts, or fails to present a fair balance of informa-
tion about the risks and benefits of the advertised drug. The "brief summary" requirement mandates
that information not required for a true statement be included if it is material. Fisherow, The Shape
of Prescription Drug Advertising: A Survey of Promotional Techniques and Regulatory Trends, 42
FoOD, DRUG, COSMETIC L.J. 213, 214-15 (1987) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(3) - (5)). The brief
summary usually appears as "small-typed, turgid scientific prose in a separate section." Fisherow,
supra, at 215. The standard of materiality has generally been interpreted to mean information "the
health professional needs to make judgments appropriately." Id.
The FDA requirements on prescription drug advertising are more stringent than the FTC re-
quirements for truth-in-advertising. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) em-
powers the FTC to enjoin certain unfair and deceptive practices. Federal Trade Commission Act of
1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1988)). In 1938,
Congress expanded the FTC's regulatory authority, allowing the agency to declare unlawful
"[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce." Wheeler-Lea Act, ch. 49, § 5(a), 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1988)). Congress allowed the FTC to define "deceptive," and the most recent interpretation of
the term is "a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting
reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment." In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C.
110, 176 (1984) (quoting letter from FTC to John D. Dingell, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983)).
This FTC standard prohibits both misleading inclusions and omissions but it does not include
requirement that the advertiser provide a "fair balance" or a "brief summary" of the characteristics
of the product. The FDA standard thus goes far beyond the FTC's deception standard.
99. Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, Prescription
Drug Advertising, 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5) (1990).
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Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 (PDMA). 1°° The PDMA es-
tablished tight restrictions on the detailing practice of distributing sample
drug packages in interstate commerce. Sampling is often considered a
paradigmatic example of pharmaceutical promotions, and it has been
studied extensively because of the massive expenditures involved in the
distribution of samples to physicians, hospital staff, nurses, and (critics
contend) any friend of the detailer. One pharmaceutical representative
reported that "the sample budget for one product could easily exceed the
total journal advertising expenditure for all products." 101 The arguments
in favor of the continued use of sampling include the medical benefits of
allowing the doctor and patient to try the product 10 2 and the social bene-
fits of allowing physicians to provide free samples to needy patients.
In 1987, Congress focused on the many ways that manufacturers,
doctors, and drug wholesalers were abusing the sampling practice. First,
they found that the apparent benefits of providing free samples were not
as significant as they seemed. Because the cost of each sample is "signifi-
cantly greater than an equivalent number of grams or ounces packaged in
trade-size containers," Congress believed sampling led to a correspond-
ing markup in drug prices.103 Moreover, sampling abuses created con-
siderable health risks because of the faulty records kept on sample
distribution.
Congress also discovered the many abuses of sampling by manufac-
turers, doctors, and drug wholesalers. They found that physicians and
wholesalers were diverting drug samples to the retail market and making
huge profits.' °4 Since neither drug companies nor physicians were re-
quired to keep records of the samples they distributed, it was nearly im-
possible to identify people who had taken the product in the case of a
recall.
In response to these problems, Congress established restrictive
guidelines for the distribution of samples. Federal law now forbids a rep-
resentative of a drug manufacturer or distributor to distribute any drug
sample unless he is responding to a written request by a practitioner.10 5
100. Pub. L. No. 100-293, 102 Stat. 95 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 331, 333, 353,
and 381 (1988)).
101. French, A Delicate Balance: A Perspective on Pharmaceutical Sampling, 124 ARCHIVES OF
DERMATOLOGY 588, 588 (1988).
102. See id. at 589.
103. Id. The cost of each sample can range from 20 to nearly 90 cents. Id. The total cost of the
samples left with physicians is between $400,000 and $500,000 daily. Prescription Drug Diversion
and Counterfeiting: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 400 (1985).
104. See Meyers, The High Cost of Prescription Drug Samples: An Argument for Federal Regula-
tion, 43 FOOD, DRUG COSM. L.J. 567, 567-69 (1988).
105. 21 U.S.C. § 353(d)(2)(A)(i) (1988).
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Moreover, the distribution can only occur "under a system which re-
quires the recipient ... to execute a written receipt for the drug sample
upon its delivery and the return of the receipt to the manufacturer or
distributor." 10 6 The manufacturer must retain these records for three
years.' 0 7 Congress also restricted the secondary or "diversion" market
for drug samples: "No person may sell, purchase, or trade or offer to
sell, purchase, or trade any drug sample."' 08 Stiff penalties are attached
to violations of these sections. 0 9 Since the adoption of the PDMA, nine
states have passed intrastate sampling statutes that are at least as strict as
the federal guidelines. 1"0 Thirty-eight states have incorporated strict
sampling restrictions from the Model State Pharmaceutical Act of the
National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NAPB). 1 1 The Model
Act prohibits any person from engaging in the "wholesale distribution in
interstate commerce of drugs ... unless such person is licensed by the
state .... 112 Although these tight restrictions will chill the sampling
arm of pharmaceutical detailing, sales representatives can and will ensure
that the educational role of sampling survives. Detailers may legally so-
licit interest in drug samples as long as they receive an official request.
Thus, through the PDMA, Congress has made a step toward delineating
between the advantages of detailing and the disadvantages of much
higher drug prices as a result of this expensive practice.
It is too early to tell whether the PDMA has effectively reduced the
abuses it addressed, 113 but compliance seems likely as a result of the
106. 21 U.S.C. § 353(d) (1988).
107. 21 U.S.C. § 353(d)(C) (1988).
108. 21 U.S.C. § 353(c)(1) (1988).
109. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1988). An individual who violates the PDMA provisions can be impris-
oned for up to 10 years and be ordered to pay a fine of up to $250,000. Id. § 333(b)(1). A manufac-
turer or distributor will be held civilly liable under the Act for violations by its representatives. The
company may be forced to pay up to $50,000 for the first two violations in 10 years, and up to $1
million for every violation of a sales representative thereafter. Id. § 333(b)(2).
110. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14053.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. § 465.015
(1981); IND. CODE § 16-6-12-8 (1981); IOWA CODE §§ 155A.38, 203B.11 (1990); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 2204-B and tit. 32, § 13789 (1981); MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 102 (1981);
MINN. STAT. § 151.43-51 (1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2925.01, 2925.36 (Anderson 1988);
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.45.050 (Supp. 1991).
111. Catizone & Aylward, The Role of the National Association ofBoards of Pharmacy in Assist-
ing the State Boards of Pharmacy to Implement the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, 44
FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 369, 370 (1989).
112. Id. The National Association of Pharmacy Boards plays a significant enforcement role for
federal pharmaceutical restrictions and continues to do so for the PDMA. The organization serves
as a databank for disciplinary information on pharmacies and develops competency exams for state
pharmacy boards. Id. at 369.
113. See Brown, The Prescription Drug Marketing Act, 45 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 245, 253.
There are currently no state or federal published opinions resolving a case under a drug sampling
statutes.
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NAPB enforcement measures, the support of the Pharmaceutical Manu-
facturing Association, a14 and the harsh penalty structure of the federal
and state statutes.1 5 The resulting reduction in the numbers of samples
distributed ensures that the samples are used for doctor and patient tri-
als. This, in turn, will lower the cost of sampling and channel the bene-
fits to the patient.
Senator Kennedy was not satisfied that the evils of detailing had
abated, and thus he sponsored a new round of hearings to specifically
investigate gift-giving and other detailing practices.1 1 6 Senator Kennedy
expressed disapproval of what he believes to be unjustified increases in
drug prices resulting from excessive promotional spending. 17 He did
not, however, propose new legislation, largely because of the prompt re-
sponse of self-regulatory bodies like the AMA and the PMA. The AMA
and PMA positions on detailing regulations may play a crucial role in
federal and state regulatory choices.
C. Self-Regulation by the AMA and PMA
The American Medical Association quickly responded to Kennedy's
promise to begin a new investigation of drug detailing practices. On De-
cember 3, 1990, just eight days before the Kennedy hearings began, the
AMA endorsed an elaborate set of guidelines for pharmaceutical promo-
tion. The PMA adopted identical provisions three days later. The as-
sociations' actions were partially a preemptive strike, and, although the
provisions delineate between improper incentive programs and gifts nec-
essary to guarantee physician awareness of new technologies, they are
unenforceable outside the disciplinary arms of the self-regulatory bodies.
The new AMA guidelines set forth the following principles:
1. Any gifts accepted by physicians individually should primarily en-
tail a benefit to patients and should not be of substantial value. Ac-
cordingly, textbooks, modest meals and other gifts are appropriate if
they serve a genuine educational function. Cash payments should not
be accepted.
3. Subsidies to underwrite the costs of continuing medical education
conferences or professional meetings . . . are permissible. Since the
giving of a subsidy directly to a physician by a company's sales repre-
114. The PMA and its member companies supported the legislation and promised self-regulation
to enforce the congressional restrictions. French, supra note 101, at 589 (noting PMA support in
letter from representative of Westwood Pharmaceuticals).
115. See supra note 109. Beyond the penalties for violations, the statute provides incentives for
others in the industry to report violations. If the manufacturer reports a violation of a representa-
tive, he avoids a civil penalty. 21 U.S.C. § 333(b)(4) (1988). The statute also provides rewards of up
to $125,000 for information about a violation that leads to an arrest. Id. § 333(b)(5).
116. Kennedy Hearings 1990, supra note 5.
117. See Kennedy Hearings, supra note 5, at 2 (opening statement of Senator Edward Kennedy).
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sentative may create a relationship which could influence the use of the
company's products, any subsidy should be accepted by the confer-
ence's sponsor who in turn can use the money to reduce the confer-
ence's registration fee.
4. Subsidies from industry should not be accepted to pay for the costs
of travel, lodging or other personal expenses of physicians attending
conferences or meetings, nor should subsidies be accepted to compen-
sate for the physicians' time.
6. No gifts should be accepted if there are strings attached. For ex-
ample, physicians should not accept gifts if they are given in relation to
the physician's prescribing practices. 118
In light of the ethical and economic analyses in the preceding sections,
these regulations are reasonably well-drafted to ,prohibit doctors and
pharmaceutical companies from engaging in patently unethical gift-giv-
ing relationships. The first principle sets forth the fundamental ethical
guideline requiring doctors to place their patients' interests first in pre-
scribing decisions. The sixth principle specifically prohibits the ex post
incentives that encourage the physician to take gifts into account in pre-
scribing decisions. These programs, such as the Wyeth "frequent pre-
scriber" plan, have proved to be the most egregious abuses of the
physicians' health care duties to their patients.
The third and fourth rules regulate another ethically controversial
practice of drug companies: sponsoring lavish educational programs in
resort areas and paying doctors' expenses for travel and entertainment.
These activities go beyond that which is necessary to encourage the edu-
cational and economic advantages of detailing. Speakers at these pro-
grams are frequently paid by drug companies and required to plug
specific products. Additionally, the education-to-entertainment ratio is
often quite low.
Another important change in the AMA and PMA codes is that they
remove the profession's imprimatur of practices that were previously un-
restricted. Although the regulations are vague in parts, they succeed in
drawing difficult lines between activities that disadvantage the patient's
interests in prescribing choices and those that ensure continued incen-
tives for pharmaceutical companies to innovate.
Despite the reasonableness of these regulations, the fact remains
that self-regulatory measures may be insufficient weapons against an in-
dustry practice that remains legally unrestricted.1 9 Although the AMA
and PMA are permitted to discipline their members, the potential risks
118. Ethical Code of the AMA, reprinted in Kennedy Hearings 1990, supra note 5, at 222-23
(testimony of Dr. Richard J. McMurray).
119. Both doctors and pharmaceutical representatives question whether these codes significantly
alter behavior. See Randall, supra note 29, at 1080 (quoting the chief executive officer of the Upjohn
Company as saying that "credibility is waning despite the proliferation of codes").
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warrant more certain enforcement. The organizations are designed and
funded by and for their members; therefore, once it becomes clear that
some regulation is necessary, it is important to ensure enforcement and
monitoring of prohibited activities by an outside body. Since monitoring
of these often secretive practices may be a difficult task for any regulatory
body, it would be best to decentralize the regulatory strategy as much as
possible. Hospitals may be one of the most effective regulators, and they
are likely to pass additional hospital regulations that are at least as strict
as a congressional enabling statute, FDA regulations, and state law re-
strictions. Additionally, hospitals would have an interest in closely mon-
itoring staff physicians to prevent institutional liability.
D. A Formula for Decentralized Enforcement
Senator Kennedy has not proposed new legislation on detailing, and,
given the difficulty that Congress may have in regulating these covert
practices, the most prudent congressional course would be to hand over
the regulatory authority to the FDA. Congress could pass enabling legis-
lation explicitly empowering the FDA to regulate detailing practices.120
Indeed, this is a logical step from the FDA's existing control over phar-
maceutical "labeling" and "advertising." Moreover, the FDA, in con-
stant and close contact with the drug companies, is in the best position to
monitor the manufacturers and levy fines or other penalties against them.
The FDA should probably adopt regulations similar to those drafted by
the AMA, but it should add a requirement that detailers provide doctors
with a "fair balance" 121 of information on a new drug product. This
would further ensure that detailing serves its educational purpose. How-
ever, FDA monitoring poses difficulties because the agency may not be
able to control minor abuses due to the its distant relationship to detail-
ers. Moreover, the FDA has little control over doctors who violate its
regulations.
State legislatures could also enhance the effective enforceability of
the congressional enactment and FDA regulations by passing regulatory
statutes. This trend followed the adoption of the Prescription Drug Mar-
keting Act and the corresponding FDA regulations.122 Not only would
the state laws and enforcement mechanisms enhance national policing of
pharmaceutical companies and doctors, but these statutes could also be
120. The FDA may possess the implicit power to control detailing activities; however, it has not
yet exercised that power, and given the presumption in existing enabling legislation that the FDA's
control extends only to written advertisements, Congress could lend clarity to this area with an
explicit authorization.
121. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 101-107 and accompanying text.
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enforced through the state licensure powers over physicians and hospi-
tals. 123 Most states monitor doctors with license renewal and continuing
medical education requirements, and state medical boards control hospi-
tals and physicians through state medical boards. These boards are
staffed with varying numbers of physicians, and their main function is to
devise and enforce licensure standards for physicians and hospitals.124
Most state legislatures retain some degree of control over licensing and
relicensing standards for physicians and hospitals, and control over hos-
pital conditions and practices is a crucial element of the police power.125
Hospitals also retain tight control over doctors' activities by granting and
terminating hospital "privileges." Therefore, the state would serve as the
penultimate regulator of doctors and hospitals, 126 and the physicians and
hospitals would have a strong incentive to regulate themselves.
There is a further level of decentralization through the private
realm. The health care field and its professionals are dominated by a
network of specialty boards in each medical field that conduct private
certification 127 and grant membership status to physicians in a specific
field who comply with the standards of the organization. During the
past twenty years, almost all new physicians have sought specialty certifi-
cation, and the percentage of board-certified physicians among those who
hold themselves out as specialists continued to grow-from sixty-two
percent in 1970 to nearly seventy percent in 1980.128 In some fields, cre-
dentials from the more powerful boards are almost essential for a sue-
123. "Licensure" is defined as:
The process by which an agency of government grants permission to an individual to en-
gage in a given occupation upon finding that the applicant has attained the minimal degree
of competency necessary to ensure that the public health, safety, and welfare will be rea-
sonably well protected.
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, CREDEN-
TIALING HEALTH MANPOWER 4, 4 (July 1977), reprinted in C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 8, at 374
[hereinafter PUBLIC HEALTH].
124. See C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 8, at 398. See, eg., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2911 through
2928 (1990) (enabling legislation for state medical board). See also Manning & Petit, The Past,
Present, and Future of Continuing Medical Education, 258 J. A.M.A. 3542, 3543 (1987) (several
state licensing boards developed CME requirements for relicensure, and, in 1987, mandatory CME
as a prerequisite for relicensure has been authorized in 27 states and implemented in 22).
125. See C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 8, at 397-403.
126. Few licenses are revoked for disciplinary reasons. The grounds for revocation or suspen-
sion are usually egregious acts, often involving drug or sexual offenses. See C. HAVIGHURST, supra
note 8, at 399. However, the disciplinary mechanism exists, and, given the recent concern over
detailing abuses in the field, these boards may be amenable to pressuring doctors and hospitals to
comply.
127. "Certification" is defined as "[the process by which a nongovernmental agency or associa-
tion grants recognition to an individual who has met certain predetermined qualifications specified
by that agency or association." PUBLIC HEALTIH, supra note 123, at 4.
128. Havighurst & King, Private Credentialing of Health Care Personnel: An Antitrust Perspec-
tive, 9 AM. J. OF L. & MED. 131, 140 (1983).
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cessful career and referrals. 129 These certification boards have a strong
interest in protecting their reputations; as a result, they will serve as an-
other regulatory body, following the lead of Congress and the FDA.
Although specialty boards do not generally conduct official investigations
of member physicians' activities, they do review the activities of all physi-
cians who apply to receive or renew certification.
The chances of success of a decentralized enforcement scheme are
stronger because physicians and hospitals have expressed their disdain
for detailing efforts that interfere with the health care interests of their
patients. Surveys of doctors and hospitals suggest that health care prov-
iders have varying levels of contempt for practices that would violate the
recently enacted AMA and PMA code. 130 In response to physician and
consumer complaints in this area, many hospitals have adopted written
policies regulating the activities of detailers inside the hospital and with
staff doctors. 131 Hospitals are huge consumers of drug products as a re-
sult of the formulary system, a policy by which hospitals select a few
drugs in each therapeutic area for in-patient use. Because of this system
(designed for more rational and cost-effective hospital purchasing), sales
representatives are often over-solicitous to hospital officials and powerful
physicians in large hospitals. 132 By 1983, 66.6 % of the 430 hospitals
randomly sampled indicated that they had established a written policy
governing detailer activities. 133 Between 1983 and 1986, approximately
twenty percent of the hospitals initially surveyed had increased their re-
strictions, including limits on drugs that could be detailed or sampled to
those that are new, inexpensive, or formulary. 134 Other hospitals have
eliminated detailer contact with nursing personnel or physician assist-
ants; some have restricted the number of exhibits or informal meal meet-
ings that a company may hold in a given time period. 135
Almost all existing hospital policies require, at minimum, that de-
tailers register with an administrator upon entering and leaving the hos-
pital and 98 of 450 respondents anticipated increases in detailer
restrictions.136 Although many policies involved reducing or eliminating
129. See, e.g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal.3d 541, 526 P.2d 253, 116
Cal. Rptr. 245 (1974) (discussing the importance of membership in orthodontic societies to a practic-
ing dentist and orthodontist).
130. See Chren, supra note 21, passim; Nelson, supra note 27, passim.
131. See Thomas I, supra note 17, at 1334; Thomas, National Survey of Recent Changes in Hos-
pital Policies on Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives' Activities, 46 AM. J. HosP. PHARM. 565, 565
(1989) [hereinafter Thomas II].
132. See Thomas I, supra note 17, at 1334.
133. Id. at 1335.
134. Thomas II, supra note 131, at 566.
135. See id. at 566-67.
136. Id. at 567.
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sampling, few placed limits on gifts. However, the survey indicated that
hospitals are interested in regulating detailing practices, and it thus
seems likely that they would not only comply with federal or state regu-
lations, but even adopt and enforce them within the hospitals. At a mini-
mum, a sign-in policy provides some oversight of a regulatory body at a
highly decentralized level.137
Therefore, the infrastructure is in place to regulate doctors, hospi-
tals, and pharmaceutical companies both internally and externally. The
PMA can regulate its member companies internally, and the FDA can
effectively check the failure of drug companies to regulate their own de-
tailing practices. The state licensing boards, the AMA, and private
credentialing organizations can also provide discipline for its own mem-
bers that work inside and outside hospitals. Finally, the states can check
the AMA's self-regulation over its member doctors, and can also control
the detailing activities that take place within hospitals, which are among
of the largest drug consumers. This complex decentralization with built-
in checks not only sets out professional guidelines for doctors and drug
representatives but also includes a multi-level enforcement and monitor-
ing device for detailing practices. With even general requirements simi-
lar to those adopted by the AMA and PMA, regulation of clearly abusive
detailing practices would be reduced in large part, and the positive edu-
cational aspects of the practices could be preserved.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The above analysis dissects the controversial practice of pharmaceu-
tical detailing by concentrating on the economic implications of the prac-
tices. Part II discounted the validity of ex post incentives that reward
doctors directly for prescribing a promoted drug and exposed the impro-
priety of elaborate drug company conferences in which doctors are paid
handsome sums to listen to a few lectures about a new product, particu-
larly in accordance with CME abuses. However, the analysis also re-
vealed that, apart from these obvious ethical problems of doctors placing
drug company incentives above their patients' health interests, smaller
gifts, luncheons, meetings, and educational symposia serve two major in-
terests for health care in this country.
First, detailing and minor gift-giving ensure that new pharmaceuti-
cal companies have a direct and effective means of promoting unfamiliar
products. This gives these companies both the ability to enter the indus-
try and the chance to recoup huge losses suffered in the risky R&D gam-
ble. Pharmaceutical manufacturers are thus encouraged to invest in
137. See id. at 567.
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innovative technologies, further benefitting the health care consumer.
There is recent evidence of decreasing profits in the industry due to the
more stringent FDA approval regulations and testing requirements.
These developments have led to increased R&D costs as well. Forcing
manufacturers to significantly reduce their promotional efforts would in-
crease the risk of innovation, thereby causing manufacturers to limit the
resources devoted to developing experimental drugs and ultimately re-
ducing the number of new products on the market. 138 Highly experimen-
tal companies could no longer hope to succeed in the industry.
Second, detailing serves an important informational purpose of
making doctors aware of the newest technologies on the market. This
helps physicians make more informed prescribing decisions, and,
although the promotional costs may be shifted to the consumer, these
costs are perhaps no greater than those physicians would shift if they
were required to survey the literature for new drug information. More-
over, patients run the risk that doctors would neglect this responsibility
completely, resulting in an even greater health cost to the patient.
Detailing practices generally serve a positive role in the health care
industry and for health care consumers; however, these benefits are not
limitless, and to date there is no legal ban on practices that may place the
physician's interest in free trips and large honoraria above her concern
for the patient's health. These abuses should be addressed, and the
AMA and PMA codes set out a reasonable means for doing so. Congress
should explicitly enable the FDA to regulate detailing promotions, and
the FDA should use these provisions as a base, adopting them in part
and providing increased penalties for detailers who give false information
about their products. With established federal regulations the interwo-
ven layers of state regulation and industry and professional self-regula-
tion can take over. These bodies should draw narrow restrictions against
ex post reward structures and gross expenditures or amenities, keeping in
mind the important and counter-intuitive economic forces at work in the
industry. Small reminder gifts and free informational lunches fill the
economic gap necessary to encourage the doctor to learn more about the
newest drug technologies. For the patient and the industry, most of
these detailing activities are primarily innocent and beneficial "freebies."
Susan Heilbronner Fisher
138. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 470.
Vol. 1991:206]
